Crosson v. Comm Social Security by unknown
2004 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-8-2004 
Crosson v. Comm Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 
Recommended Citation 
"Crosson v. Comm Social Security" (2004). 2004 Decisions. 849. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/849 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
    *The Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No.  03-2703
MARY J. CROSSON,
               Appellant
     v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
_____________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Judge: The Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
(D.C. No. 02-cv-1074)
______________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1
March 23, 2004
Before: FUENTES, SMITH and GIBSON,* Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 8, 2004)
_____________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Mary J. Crosson appeals from a judgment of the District Court affirming the
    1Crosson also submits that the ALJ erred at step three because he failed to adequately
explain why her impairments did not satisfy the criteria of the impairments listed in
2
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 423.  The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review “is identical
to that of the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner’s decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir.
1999).  Substantial evidence is  “more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).  
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner must follow the
familiar five-step sequential analysis set forth in the regulations promulgated by the
Social Security Administration.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.   Crosson claims she is
disabled due to limitations resulting from a cervical laminectomy and depression.  She
contends that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred at step five of the analysis by
concluding that she had the residual functional capacity to perform other work in the
national economy.  That conclusion, according to Crosson, is not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ failed to accord sufficient weight to the opinions of her treating
physicians, Doctors Shingles and Gross.  In addition, Crosson argues that the ALJ
improperly discounted her testimony regarding her limitations.1
Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations as required by Burnett v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d
112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1).  This argument is
without merit inasmuch as the ALJ identified the specific listings at issue and explained
why Crosson failed to satisfy the criteria of either listing.  
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In Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985), we instructed that a
plaintiff’s subjective complaints must be seriously considered and that the ALJ may not
discount a plaintiff’s testimony if it is reasonably supported by medical evidence.  In
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999), we declared that treating physician
opinions “should be accorded great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect expert
judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a prolonged
period of time.’”  Id. (quoting Rocco v. Heckler, 826 F.32d 1348, 1350 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
This does not mean, however, that a 
statement by a plaintiff’s treating physician supportive of an assertion that
she is “disabled” or “unable to work” is . . . dispositive of the issue.  The
ALJ must review all the medical findings and other evidence presented in
support of the attending physician’s opinion of total disability.  In doing so,
the ALJ must weigh the relative worth of a treating physician’s report . . . .
Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 47-48 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).  After reviewing all of the evidence, the ALJ may discount a physician
opinion of disability which is not supported by medical evidence, or may reject a
physician’s opinion outright if it is contradicted by other medical evidence.  Plummer,
186 F.3d at 429.  
Here, the ALJ complied with this standard.  He accorded great weight to Crosson’s
testimony and the opinions of Doctors Shingles and Gross by concluding that Crosson
4was limited to light and sedentary work affording the option to sit and to stand, which
was routine and unskilled, requiring minimal concentration.  
Crosson argues that the ALJ erred because both of her physicians opined that she
was unable to return to work.  The ALJ acknowledged these opinions and appropriately
explained that they were discounted because the medical evidence was not fully
supportive.  The ALJ noted that Crosson’s surgeon, Dr. Freese, had been unable to find
an objective clinical basis for her ongoing complaints of pain and opined that the “plates
and screws are in good position, and the fusion seems to be intact.  There is no evidence
of significant neural element compression.”  The ALJ also pointed out that both Doctors
Shingles and Gross’s opinions were undermined by documentation that Crosson’s
condition was improving.  Notably, Dr. Shingles’s opinion that Crosson’s residual
functional capacity was severely limited was contradicted by his consistent observations
that Crosson had no neurologic deficits.  The evidence of record supports the ALJ’s
explanation.
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, we conclude that there was
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision that Crosson was not disabled.  We
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
